Contributions in Merlin

In the present paper, relationships between embeddedness, power, control and innovation are examined in the context ofthe telecommunications sector. It is contended that in a tightly embedded, technology-intensive sector, technological and economic control are closeb intertwined. Consequently, the ability to appropriate economic rents is large& based on technological control. In an examination of the Finnish telecommunications sector, it is concluded that the power of the network operator was traditionally not based as much on value creation as on the control of critical resources. With the move to a network of networks in which access ceases to be a bottleneck, this situation has changed. It can be expected that existing focal networks with a strong power imbalance will be replaced. It is difficult to predict what form this process will take, however, as the pace of technological change is very rapid in the telecommunications sector.

This paper offers a theory of development that links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence projects limits the degree of risk spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to avoid highly risky investments slows down capital accumulation, and the inability to diversify idiosyncratic risk introduces a large amount of uncertainty in the growth process. The typical development pattern will consist of a lengthy period of “primitive accumulation” with highly variable output, followed by takeoff and financial deepening and, finally, steady growth. “Lucky” countries will spend relatively less time in the primitive accumulation stage and develop faster. Although all agents are price takers and there are no technological spillovers, the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient because individuals do not take into account their impact on others' diversification opportunities. We also show that our results generalize to economies with international capital flows.

We consider a regulator's choice between environmentally motivated emissions taxes and output taxes. We investigate how the optimal instrument depends on the monitoring cost function, the firm's technology, and on social preferences regarding output and environmental quality. Pure emissions taxes are usually not optimal with monitoring costs. Pure output taxes are optimal under sufficiently high monitoring costs, sufficiently limited options for emission reduction by means other than output reduction, and sufficiently high substitutability of the output. Finally, conditions for the optimality of mixed taxes are given.

null