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Contributions in Merlin

Contributions
Julian Gallop, The Socio-Economic Environment (D2.2.1 Vol. 1), Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Burkhard Stiller, Cristian Morariu, Peter Racz, Martin Waldburger, Mobile Systems I, Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Martin Hafner, The Akogrimo Consolidated Value Chain (D3.2.1), Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Jürgen Jähnert, Stefan Wesner, Overall Architecture Definition and Layer Integration (D3.1.1), Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Antonis Litke, Architecture of the Infrastructure Services Layer (D4.3.1), Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Burkhard Stiller, Jan Mischke, Peer-to-peer Search and Scalability, In: Peer-to-peer Systems and Applications, Springer, Heidelberg, p. 269 - 288, 2005. (Book Chapter) null
Jan Gerke, David Hausheer, Peer-to-Peer Market Management, In: Peer-to-Peer Systems and Applications, Springer, Heidelberg, p. 491 - 508, 2005. (Book Chapter) null
Per-Oddvar Osland, Overall Network Middleware Requirements (D4.2.1), Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Per-Oddvar Osland, Integrated Services Design and Implementation Report (D4.2.2), Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
Andrea Schenker-Wicki, Mark Hürlimann, Studie zur Standardisierung von Kosten und zur Finanzierung im Tertiärbereich im Rahmen der schweizerischen Hochschulreformen, 2005. (Other Publication) null
Qualität messen - Qualität managen: Leistungsparameter im Studium, Edited by: Andrea Schenker-Wicki, Köln, 2005. (Proceedings) null
Felix Kübler, Karl Schmedders, Approximate Versus Exact Equilibria in Dynamic Economices, Econometrica, Vol. 73 (4 (07)), 2005. (Journal Article) This paper develops theoretical foundations for an error analysis of approximate equilibria in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. While there are several algorithms that compute prices and allocations for which agents' first-order conditions are approximately satisfied ("approximate equilibria"), there are few results on how to interpret the errors in these candidate solutions and how to relate the computed allocations and prices to exact equilibrium allocations and prices. We give a simple example to illustrate that approximate equilibria might be very far from exact equilibria. We then interpret approximate equilibria as equilibria for close-by economies; that is, for economies with close-by individual endowments and preferences. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
Renato Pajarola, Processing Streams of Points, Version: 1, 2005. (Technical Report) null
E-Government: Towards electronic democracy, Edited by: Michael Hanspeter Böhlen, Johann Gamper, Wolfgang Polasek, Maria Wimmer, Springer, Bozen - Bolzano, Italy, 2005. (Proceedings) This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the International Conference on E-Government, TCGOV 2005, held in Bolzano, Italy in March 2005. The 28 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 92 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on e-democracy: improving citizen participation and policy making, e-democracy: experiences from different countires, political and societal implications, security for e-government services, semantic Web technologies, architectures for government application integration, case studies for government application integration, decision support systems, managerial and financial aspects of e-government projects, and e-procurement.
Andrea Schenker-Wicki, Thomas Griessen, Die Bestimmungen der Performance im New Public Management: Theorie und Praxis, In: 10 Jahre New Public Management in der Schweiz: Bilanz, Irrtümer und Erfolgsfaktoren, Haupt, Bern, p. 133 - 147, 2005. (Book Chapter)
Roland Fryer, Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt, Experience-Based Discrimination: Classroom Games, The Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 36 (2), 2005. (Journal Article) null
Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, An experimental study of costly coordination, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 51 (2), 2005. (Journal Article) Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
Jacob Goeree, Charles A. Holt, An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99 (02), 2005. (Journal Article) null
Jacob Goeree, Emiel Maasland, Sander Onderstal, John L. Turner, How (Not) to Raise Money, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113 (4), 2005. (Journal Article) null
Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt, Thomas Palfrey, Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium, Experimental Economics, Vol. 8 (4), 2005. (Journal Article) null

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