Contributions in Merlin

Previous research has reported that attention to color afterimages speeds up their decay. However, the inducing stimuli in these studies have been overlapping, thereby implying that they involved overlapping receptive fields of the responsible neurons. As a result it is difficult to interpret the effect of focusing attention on a phenomenally projected target-afterimage. Here, we present a method free from these shortcomings. In searching for a target-afterimage patch among spatially separate alternatives the target fades from awareness before its competitors. This offers a good means to study neural correlates of visual awareness unconfounded with attention and enabling a temporally extended pure phenomenal experience free from simultaneous inflow of sensory transients.

We set up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders on one side and providers on the other. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows us to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers' side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of the competition depends mainly on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on the providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO receives a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans' competition, our model provides a new insight to understand the increase in the PPOs' market share as observed in the USA during the last decade.

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We present here an overview of the use of networks in Finance and Economics. We show how this approach enables us to address important questions as, for example, the structure of control chains in financial systems, the systemic risk associated with them and the evolution of trade between nations. All these results are new in the field and allow for a better understanding and modelling of different economic systems.

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Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) study the role of transfer pricing and organizational choice in providing incentives for efficient decisions on the acquisition and subsequent reallocation of capacity within decentralized firms. Their analysis suggests that transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. They also find that symmetric responsibility center structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment incentives than hybrid organizations. An important condition for the derivation of the two results is the linearity of the shadow prices of capacity. If shadow prices are nonlinear, transfer prices should be below (above) the historical cost of capacity in order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Because profit center organizations can use transfer prices for mitigating the inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices, they offer a natural advantage over pure investment center organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions. Overall, these observations suggest that the curvature of profit functions is an important factor in determining the suitable instruments for decentralized capacity management.