Simon Gächter, Ernst Fehr, Fairness in the Labour Market - A Survey of Experimental Results, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 114, 2002. (Working Paper)
In this chapter we provide a selective survey of experiments to investigate the potential of social motivations in explaining labour market phenomena. We argue that laboratory experiments are a useful instrument to explore issues in labour market theory and personnel economics. Our starting point is the observation that employment relations are frequently governed by incomplete contracts. We show that the norm of reciprocity that leads to gift exchanges is an effective contract enforcement device under conditions of contractual incompleteness. We then present evidence that gift exchange can explain various labour market phenomena that are puzzles from the viewpoint of standard economic theory. Further issues in the related field of personnel economics that have by now been subjected to an experimental scrutiny concern characteristics of the employment relation and the issues of motivation and incentives systems. |
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Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 34, 2002. (Working Paper)
In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may undermine voluntary cooperation. This suggests that explicit incentives may have costly side effects that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the undermining effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Buyers, who are in the role of principals, nonetheless, prefer the incentive contracts because they allow them tonappropriate a much larger share of the (smaller) total surplus and are, hence, more profitable for them. The undermining of voluntary cooperation through incentives is, in principle, consistent with models of inequity aversion and reciprocity. Additional experiments show, however, that the reduction of voluntary cooperation throughnincentives is partly due to a framing effect. |
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Rafael Lalive, Josef Zweimüller, Benefit Entitlement and Unemployment Duration: The Role of Policy Endogeneity, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 112, 2002. (Working Paper)
"The potential duration of benefits is generally viewed as an important determinant of unemployment duration. This paper evaluates a unique policy change that prolonged entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions of Austria. In the evaluation, we explicitly account for the fact that the program was an endogenous policy response to a crisis affecting individuals with severe labor market problems. The main results are: (i) REBP reduced the transition rate to jobs by 17 ; (ii) accounting for endogenous policy adoption is important and quantitatively significant." |
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Rafael Lalive, Jan C van Ours, Josef Zweimüller, The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 110, 2002. (Working Paper)
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy. |
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Reto Föllmi, Josef Zweimüller, Structural Change and the Kaldor Facts of Economic Growth, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 111, 2002. (Working Paper)
"We present a model in which two of the most important features of the long-run growth process are reconciled: the massive changes in the structure of production and employment; and the Kaldor facts of economic growth. We assume that households expand their consumption along a hierarchy of needs and firms introduce continuously new products. In equilibrium industries with an expanding and those with a declining employment share co-exist, and each such industry goes (or has already gone) through a cycle of take-off, maturity, and stagnation. Nonetheless macroeconomic aggregates grow pari passu at a constant rate." |
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Rainer Winkelmann, Why do firms recruit internationally? Result from the IZA International Employer Survey 2000, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 202, 2002. (Working Paper)
The paper studies the demand for foreign university graduates at the firm level. Using a unique dataset on recruitment policies of firms in four European countries, the determinants of demand for internationally mobile highly skilled employees are established. I investigate the number, origin, skills, and functions of foreign graduates, as well as the experiences of firms recruiting internationally. A number of hypotheses for the international demand are formulated and assessed. Foreign highly-skilled employees are recruited mainly because of their special skills that are not available domestically, be it international competence or technical know-how. |
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Rainer Winkelmann, Work and health in Switzerland: Immigrants and Natives, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 203, 2002. (Working Paper)
This paper is concerned with a comparison of immigrants and Swiss citizens with respect to level of education, labor market outcomes and healthcare utilization. The evidence is based on data for 1999 from the first wave of the Swiss Household Panel. In order to control for confounding influences, linear and non-linear (negative binomial) regressio nmodels are used. The main result is that differences in economic position between immigrants and Swiss nationals tend to be smaller than those found in other countries. The observed differences (higher employment levels of immigrant women, lower earnings of immigrant men, higher healthcare utilization rates of all immigrants) tend to be no larger than those observed between Swiss citizens living in different parts of the country. |
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Bruno Frey, Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 107, 2002. (Working Paper)
Empirical evidence is provided for the importance of non-reciprocal pro-social behavior of individuals in an anonymous, n-person pure public good setting. A unique panel data set of 136,000 observations is matched with an extensive survey.nEven under anonymous conditions, a large number of individuals are prepared to donate a not insignificant sum of money. Cooperation conditional on giving by specific other personsn(reciprocity) is present but the causal relationship is ambiguous. It is crucially important, whether, and in what way, one is asked to donate. Identification with the organization is also important. |
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Martin Brown, Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 38, 2002. (Working Paper)
"We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, i.e., the absence of third party enforcement of workers effort or the quality of the good traded, causes a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are initiated by public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. Moreover, the short side of the market attempts to appropriate the whole gains from trade, which causes much disagreement about contract terms.nIf contracts are incomplete the vast majority of trades are initiated by private offers. The contracting parties form long-term relations and the provision of low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship. The threat of terminating the relation turns out to be an extremely powerful discipline device. " |
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Rafael Lalive, Jan C van Ours, Josef Zweimüller, The Impact of Active Labor Market Programs on the Duration of Unemployment, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 41, 2002. (Working Paper)
In 1997, the Swiss government introduced active labor market programs on a large scale to improve the job chances of unemployed workers. This paper evaluates the effect of these programs on the duration of unemployment. Our evaluation methodology allows for selectivity affecting the inflow into programs. We find that in most cases the programs do not reduce the duration of unemployment. The exception is the program of temporary wage subsidies which reduces unemployment, but only for foreign workers. From a cost-benefit point of view, temporary wage subsidies seem to be the only program worthwhile pursuing. |
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Andreas Polk, Multilateral Agreement On Investments (MAI) - A Critical Assessment From an Industrial Economics Point of View, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 201, 2002. (Working Paper)
Though the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) has failed, the original draft is likely to serve as a basis for future negotiations. This article gives a critical assessment of the draft from an industrial economics point of view. First, I summarize the contents of the agreement which is relevant for market structure and competition. Then I develop the industrial economics approach, which serves as a basis for criticism. I conclude that a multilateral agreement on investment should (i) recognize competition concerns, (ii) give a suitable de.nition of investment, and (iii) should help to establish competition authorities in less developed countries. |
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Bruno Frey, Stephan Meier, Two Concerns about Rational Choice: Indoctrination and Imperialism, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 104, 2002. (Working Paper)
Rational Choice Theory is often criticized to indoctrinate students in a negative, which is supported by some laboratory experiments. But do students of Rational Choice Theory really behave more selfishly? This paper presents evidence from a natural decision on voluntary donation at the University of Zurich. The analysis of the very large panel data set reaches significant different results than previous studies: Rational Choice Theory does not indoctrinate students. However, there are good other reasons to criticize Rational Choice Theory. The paper argues that ideas from other social sciences should be imported to improve the theory. Three elements are presented which lead to new and different policy conclusions. |
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Lars P Feld, Bruno Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 98, 2002. (Working Paper)
"Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or ""psychological"" contract. Studies on tax evasion in Switzerland show that the more strongly the political participation rights arendeveloped, the more important this contract is, and the higher tax morale is. In this paper,nempirical evidence based on a survey of tax authorities of the 26 Swiss states (cantons) isnpresented, indicating that the differences in the treatment of taxpayers by tax authorities cannbe explained by differences in political participation rights as well." |
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Bruno Frey, Stephan Meier, Selfish and Indoctrinated Economists?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 103, 2002. (Working Paper)
Many people believe that economists in general are more selfish than other people and that this greater selfishness is due to economics education. This paper offers empirical evidence against this widely held belief. Using a unique data set on giving behaviour in connection with two social funds at the University of Zurich, it is shown that economics education does not make people act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the particular behaviour of economists can be explained by a selection effect. |
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Daniel Waldenström, Bruno Frey, How Government Bond Prices Reflect Wartime Events. The Case of the Stockholm Market, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 102, 2002. (Working Paper)
How are political events reflected in financial asset prices? Break points in sovereign debt prices are analyzed for Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Germany and Belgium during 1930-1948, using unique data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Unlike in countries in-volved in WWII, this market was unregulated. The outbreak of World War II heavily depressed prices of government bonds. Countries which were occupied (Belgium, Denmark and Norway) or under attack (Finland) saw their debt depreciate substantially. The battle of Stalingrad turns out indeed to be a turning-point of the war. This approach represents a complementary quantitative method to analyze the impact of political events. |
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Beat Hotz-Hart, Carsten Küchler, Ausblick auf eine Innovationspolitik der Schweiz, Die Volkswirtschaft, Vol. 75 (12), 2002. (Journal Article)
Wie in allen hoch entwickelten Volkswirtschaften ist die Sicherung von Wohlstand und Lebensqualität in der Schweiz nur möglich, sofern die Unternehmen im globalen Innovationswettbewerb erfolgreich sind. Bildung, Forschung und Technologie kommt deshalb eine überragende Bedeutung zu. Ebenso wichtig sind die Wechselwirkungen an den Schnittstellen von Wissenschaft, Technik, Berufsbildung, Unternehmen und internationalen Netzwerken. Die Herausforderungen und Chancen des Innovationswettbewerbs betreffen nicht nur einige Pionierfirmen, sondern die Lebensumstände aller in der Schweiz lebenden und arbeitenden Menschen. Ziel der Innovationspolitik ist es, die Innovationsfähigkeit des gesamten Wirtschaftsstandorts Schweiz sicherzustellen beziehungsweise zu erhöhen. |
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Colin F Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 97, 2002. (Working Paper)
Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary explanations of and social preference theory in organizing the data in a coherent way. |
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Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 84, 2002. (Working Paper)
A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) the effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures. |
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Rafael Lalive, Josef Zweimüller, Benefit Entitlement and the Labor Market: Evidence from a Large-Scale Policy Change, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 105, 2002. (Working Paper)
This paper analyzes the impact of the Austrian Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) on the labor market outcomes for elderly workers in Austria. The REBP extended entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions. This policy change created a large-scale quasi-experimental situation from which a lot can be learned about the impact of unemployment insurance rules on the dynamics of employment, unemployment, and wages. We find that the REBP led to a tremendous increase in unemployment which was due to both an increase in the inflow to and thenoutflow from unemployment. The REBP also induced a strong increase in early retirement and in many cases, in particular for steel workers, entering unemployment meant withdrawal from the labor force. Finally, we show that there were also non-negligible eects of extended benefits on the level and the distribution of wages. |
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Harry Telser, Nutzenmessung im Gesundheitswesen: Die Methode der Discrete-Choice-Experimente, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2002. (Dissertation)
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