Contributions published at Foundations of Business Administration and Theories of the Firm (Andreas Scherer)

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Organization theory and business ethics are essentially the positive and normative sides of the very same coin, reflecting on how human cooperative activities are organized and how they ought to be organized respectively. It is therefore unfortunate that—due to the relatively impermeable manmade boundaries segregating the corresponding scholarly communities into separate schools and departments, professional associations, and scientific journals—the potential symbiosis between the two fields has not yet fully materialized. In this essay we make a modest attempt at establishing further connectivity by surveying the terrain covered by the two disciplines jointly, as if the boundaries between them did not matter. We commence by providing a concise overview of the organization theory discipline for interested non-specialists from the field of business ethics. Next, we proceed to point out four research themes commonly investigated by members of both communities, and also a variety of organization-theoretical perspectives on each. In the final part of this essay we explore what organization theory has to offer business ethics, and what the boundaries of that potential contribution are. We warn skeptical readers in advance that the spirit and tone of our essay is most definitely upbeat, as we are convinced that the potential for symbiosis between the two fields is vast and inspiring, even though it has only been unleashed partially and incidentally thus far.

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In this paper we address the democratic deficit that emerges when private corporations engage with public policy, either by providing citizenship rights and global public goods (corporate citizenship) or by influencing the political system and lobbying for their economic interests (strategic corporate political activities). This democratic deficit is significant, especially when multinational corporations operate in locations where national governance mechanisms are weak or even fail, where the rule of law is absent and there is a lack of democratic control. This may lead to a decline in the social acceptance of the business firm and its corporate political activities and, thus, to a loss of corporate legitimacy. Under these conditions corporations may compensate the emerging democratic deficit and reestablish their legitimacy by internalizing democratic mechanisms within their organizations, in particular in their corporate governance structures and procedures. We analyze the available corporate governance models with the help of a typology and discuss the possible contributions of a new form of democratic corporate governance.

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The relationship between theory and practice has been discussed in the social sciences for generations. Academics from management and organization studies regularly lament the divide between theory and practice. They regret the insufficient academic knowledge of managerial problems and their solutions, and criticize the scholarly production of theories that are not relevant for organizational practice (Hambrick 1994). Despite the prevalence of this topic in academic discourse, we do not know much about what kind of academic knowledge would be useful to practice, how it would be produced and how the transfer of knowledge between theory and practice actually works. In short, we do not know how we can make academic work more relevant for practice or even whether this would be desirable. In this introduction to the Special Issue, we apply philosophical, theoretical and empirical perspectives to examine the challenges of studying the generation and use of academic knowledge. We then briefly describe the contribution of the seven papers that were selected for this Special Issue. Finally, we discuss issues that still need to be addressed, and make some proposals for future avenues of research.

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Corporate governance practice is mainly centered on the protection of investors’ rights. However, this view neglects the fundamental changes in the operating conditions of business due to globalization and the weakening of regulatory frameworks. Weak or absent enforcement of contracts, increasingly unfettered negative externalities of corporate action, and involvement of private actors in the provision of public goods change the role of business in a fundamental way, rendering it a political actor. Resulting in the extension of corporate power these developments challenge the very assumptions of efficiency based corporate governance theory. Recurrent misuse of power poses a threat to organizational legitimacy as well as to the legitimacy of the capitalist system. Drawing on suggestions to restore organizational legitimacy by means of discursive processes, we argue that opening corporate governance to such processes is a suitable means to safeguard organizational legitimacy in a globalized world. Based on these considerations, basic requirements as well as limits for modification of current corporate governance practice are introduced.