Manuel Ammann, Philipp Horsch, David Oesch, Competing with Superstars, Management Science, Vol. 62 (10), 2016. (Journal Article)
This paper investigates the effect of superstar chief executive officers (CEOs) on their competitors. Exploiting shocks to CEO status due to prestigious media awards, we document a significant positive stock market performance of competitors of superstar CEOs subsequent to the award. The effect is more pronounced for competitors who have not received an award themselves, who are geographically close to an award winner, and who are not entrenched. We observe an increase in risk taking, operating performance, and innovation activity of superstars’ competitors as potential channels for this positive performance. Our results suggest a positive overall welfare impact of corporate superstar systems due to the incentivizing effect on superstars’ competitors. |
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Fabrizio Ferri, David Oesch, Management influence on investors: evidence from shareholder votes on the frequency of say on pay, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 33 (4), 2016. (Journal Article)
The literature on shareholder voting has mostly focused on the influence of proxy advisors on shareholder votes. We exploit a unique empirical setting enabling us to provide a direct estimate of management's influence. Analyzing shareholder votes on the frequency of future say on pay (SOP) votes, we find that a management recommendation for a particular frequency is associated with a 26 percent increase in voting support for that frequency. Additional tests suggest that the documented association is likely to capture a causal effect. Management influence varies across firms and is smaller at firms where perceived management credibility is lower. Compared to firms adopting an annual frequency, firms following management's recommendation to adopt a triennial frequency are significantly less likely to change their compensation practices in response to an adverse SOP vote, consistent with the notion that a less frequent vote results in lower management accountability. |
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David Oesch, Vergleichsgruppen Schweizer Unternehmen - eine empirische Analyse, In: Finanz- und Rechnungswesen: Jahrbuch, WEKA, Zürich, p. 217 - 233, 2016. (Book Chapter)
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Rustom M. Irani, David Oesch, Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 51 (02), 2016. (Journal Article)
We study how securities analysts influence managers’ use of different types of earnings management. To isolate causality, we employ a quasi-experiment that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst following resulting from brokerage house mergers. We find that managers respond to the coverage loss by decreasing real earnings management while increasing accrual manipulation. These effects are significantly stronger among firms with less coverage and for firms close to the zero-earnings threshold. Our causal evidence suggests that managers use real earnings management to enhance short-term performance in response to analyst pressure, effects that are not uncovered when focusing solely on accrual-based methods. |
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David Oesch, Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, Does the director election system matter? Evidence from majority voting, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 20 (1), 2015. (Journal Article)
We examine the effect of a change in the director election system—the switch from a plurality voting standard to a more stringent standard known as majority voting (MV). Using a regression discontinuity design, we document abnormal returns of 1.43–1.60 % around annual meeting dates where shareholder proposals to adopt MV are voted upon, suggesting that shareholders perceive the adoption of MV as value-enhancing. We document an increase in boards’ responsiveness to shareholders at MV firms. In particular, relative to a propensity score-matched control sample, firms adopting MV exhibit an increase in the rate of implementation of shareholder proposals supported by a majority vote and in the responsiveness to votes withheld from directors up for election. We do not find a relation between votes withheld and subsequent director turnover, regardless of the election standard. Overall, it appears that, rather than a channel to remove specific directors, director elections are viewed by shareholders as a means to obtain specific governance changes and that, in this respect, their ability to obtain such changes is stronger under a MV standard. |
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David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, Markus Schmid, The construction and valuation effect of corporate governance indices, In: Handbook of research methods and applications in empirical finance, Edward Elgar, Cheltham, p. 314 - 340, 2013. (Book Chapter)
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David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, Markus M Schmid, Product market competition, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the EU -area, European financial management, Vol. 19 (3), 2013. (Journal Article)
This paper investigates whether the valuation effect of corporate governance depends on the degree of competition in the companies’ product markets in a large international sample covering 14 countries from the European Union (EU). Besides providing external validity of previous US-centred studies, this paper uses more comprehensive and reliable measures of both product market competition and corporate governance. Consistent with the hypothesis that product market competition acts as a substitute for corporate governance as competitive pressure imposes discipline on managers to maximise firm value, our results show that corporate governance significantly increases firm value in non-competitive industries only. When investigating the channels through which firm value may be increased, we find that good governance for firms in non-competitive industries leads them to have more capital expenditures, spend less on acquisitions, and be less likely to diversify. Our results are robust to a large number of robustness checks including the use of alternative measures of competition and governance, as well as using alternative regression specifications. |
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David Oesch, Rustom M Irani, Monitoring and corporate disclosure: Evidence from a natural experiment, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109 (2), 2013. (Journal Article)
Using an experimental design that exploits exogenous reductions in coverage resulting from brokerage house mergers, we find that a reduction in coverage causes a deterioration in financial reporting quality. The effect of coverage on disclosure is more pronounced for firms with weak shareholder rights, consistent with a substitution effect between analyst monitoring and other corporate governance mechanisms. The effects we uncover using our experimental design are an order of magnitude larger than estimates from ordinary least squares regressions that do not account for the endogeneity of coverage. Overall, our results suggest that security analysts monitor managers and entrenched managers adopt less informative disclosure policies in the absence of such scrutiny. |
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David Oesch, Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, Shareholder votes and proxy advisors: Evidence from say on pay, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 51 (5), 2013. (Journal Article)
We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory “say on pay” votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and do not appear to follow a “one-size-fits-all” approach. PAs’ recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcome but the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these recommendations varies with the institutional ownership structure, and the rationale behind the recommendation, suggesting that at least some shareholders do not blindly follow these recommendations. More than half of the firms respond to the adverse shareholder vote triggered by a negative recommendation by engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation plan. However, we find no market reaction to the announcement of such changes, even when material enough to result in a favorable recommendation and vote the following year. Our findings suggest that, rather than identifying and promoting superior compensation practices, PAs' key economic role is processing a substantial amount of executive pay information on behalf of institutional investors, hence reducing their cost of making informed voting decisions. Our findings contribute to the literature on shareholder voting and the related policy debate. |
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David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, Sandro Odoni, An alternative three-factor model for international markets: Evidence from the European Monetary Union, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 36 (7), 2012. (Journal Article)
In this paper, we construct the three-factor model introduced by Chen et al. (2010) for a European sample covering 10 countries from the European Monetary Union and the period from 1990 to 2006. Two key findings result. First, we show that the properties of the European factors are comparable to those of the US factors. Second, we show that the alternative three-factor model’s explanatory power is either equal or superior to the explanatory power of traditional models when applied to five commonly known stock market anomalies. Our results thus suggest the use of international versions of the Chen et al. (2010) factor model in addition to traditional factor models in international empirical finance research. |
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David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, Markus Schmid, Are better governed companies rewarded by capital markets?, Business and Economy, India: Banking, Finance, Markets, 2011. (Journal Article)
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David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, Markus M Schmid, Corporate governance and firm value: International evidence, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 18 (1), 2011. (Journal Article)
In this paper, we investigate the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm value based on a large and previously unused dataset from Governance Metrics International(GMI) comprising 6663 firm-year observations from 22 developed countries over the period from 2003 to 2007. Based on a set of 64 individual governance attributes we construct two alternative additive corporate governance indices with equal weights attributed to the governance attributes and one index derived from a principal component analysis. For all three indices we find a strong and positive relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm valuation. In addition, we investigate the value relevance of governance attributes that document the companies' social behavior. Regardless of whether these attributes are considered individually or aggregated into indices, and even when “standard” corporate
governance attributes are controlled for, they exhibit a positive and significant effect on firmvalue. Our findings are robust to alternative calculation procedures for the corporate governance indices and to alternative estimation techniques. |
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David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, Ralf Seiz, Zu welchem Preis hilft der Bund der UBS?, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 273, p. 31, 21 November 2008. (Newspaper Article)
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