Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz, The intrinsic value of decision rights, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 120, 2014. (Working Paper)
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal - at least partly - from an assumed positive intrinsic value of decision rights. Providing clean evidence for the existence of this intrinsic value and measuring its size, however, is intricate. Here, we develop a method capable of achieving these goals. The data reveal that the large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefit. The intrinsic valuation of decision rights has potentially important consequences for corporate governance, human resource management, and optimal job design: it may explain why managers value power, why employees appreciate jobs with task discretion, why individuals sort into self-employment, and why the reallocation of decision rights is often very difficult and cumbersome. Our method and results may also prove useful in developing an empirical revealed preference foundation for concepts such as "freedom of choice" and "individual autonomy". |
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Björn Bartling, Klaus Schmidt, Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2014. (Journal Article)
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Lino Stoessel, Risk Taking for Others: Behavior and Responsibility Attributions, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2013. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Tiziana Hunziker, Prozedurale Fairness: Normative Konzepte und empirische Evidenz, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2013. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 11 (4), 2013. (Journal Article)
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing the latter to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of efficient long-run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the firm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the firm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) critique of the Coasian approach. |
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Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 169 (1), 2013. (Journal Article)
In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents. |
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Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 98, 2012. (Working Paper)
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing them to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of efficient long-run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the firm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the firm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) critique of the Coasian approach. |
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Björn Bartling, Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model, Economics Letters, Vol. 116 (3), 2012. (Journal Article)
This paper analyzes the impact of wage comparisons among inequity-averse agents on optimal incentive intensities in a linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model with multi-tasking. We consider individual and team production tasks that differ in that only individual production causes wage inequality. If the tasks are substitutes in the agents’ effort cost functions, the principal might want to balance incentives and reduce the agents’ overall inequality exposure. We show that team production incentives can then be muted below the level that results from noisy measurement and risk aversion alone—even though team production does not cause wage inequality. |
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Björn Bartling, Klaus M Schmidt, Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 89, 2012. (Working Paper)
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. We do not find that these effects are stronger when the initial contract is concluded under competitive rather than monopolistic conditions. |
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Karin Schlieper, Die Wirkung expliziter Anreize auf die Leistung von Mitarbeitern: Eine Bestandsaufnahme der empirischen Forschung, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2012. (Master's Thesis)
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Loris Eichenberger, Aktive Entscheidungen versus Handlungsunterlassungen: Ökonomische Konsequenzen und Verantwortungszuweisung bei vorgegebenen Standardoptionen, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2012. (Bachelor's Thesis)
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Simon Murbach, Die Auswirkung von Automatismen bei Nichtaktivität auf ökonomische Ergebnisse und die Zuweisung von Verantwortlichkeit, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2012. (Master's Thesis)
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Björn Bartling, Leif Brandes, Daniel Schunk, Expectations as reference points: field evidence from experienced subjects in a competitive, high-stakes environment, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 73, 2012. (Working Paper)
We show that professional soccer players exhibit reference-dependent behavior during matches. Controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity, we show on a minute-by-minute basis that a player breaches the rules of the game, measured by the referee’s assignment of cards, with a significantly higher probability if his team is behind the expected match outcome, measured by pre-play betting odds of large professional bookmakers. We derive these results in two independent data sets, one from ten seasons of the German Bundesliga, the other from eight seasons the English Premier League, each with more than half a million minutes of play. |
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Björn Bartling, Endogenous social comparisons and the internal organization of firms, Managerial And Decision Economics, Vol. 33 (1), 2012. (Journal Article)
Should workers of a firm be organizationally integrated to realize benefits from benchmarking? Or should they be separated to preclude horizontal social comparisons? This paper highlights a trade-off that arises if social comparisons in firms are endogenous. We analyze a principal multi-agent model in which the principal trades off the reduction of agents' risk exposures by use of relative performance evaluation and the thereby induced social comparisons for which agents must be compensated. Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the performance measures are sufficiently correlated relative to the agents' regard for others |
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Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, Screening, competition, and jobdesign: economic origins of good jobs, American Economic Review, Vol. 102 (2), 2012. (Journal Article)
High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effortproductivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for workattitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performancework systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, andscreening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emergeendogenously in our experiments: "bad" jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rentsharing,and "good" jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobsare profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters theirdissemination. |
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Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr, Daniel Schunk, Health effects on children's willingness to compete, Experimental Economics, Vol. 15 (1), 2012. (Journal Article)
The formation of human capital is important for a society's welfare and economic success. Recent literature shows that child health can provide an important explanation for disparities in children’s human capital development across different socio-economic groups. While this literature focuses on cognitive skills as determinants of human capital, it neglects non-cognitive skills. We analyze data from economic experiments with preschoolers and their mothers to investigate whether child health can explain developmental gaps in children’s non-cognitive skills. Our measure for children’s noncognitive skills is their willingness to compete with others. Our findings suggest that health problems are negatively related to children’s willingness to compete and that the effect of health on competitiveness differs with socio-economic background. Health has a strongly negative effect in our sub-sample with low socioeconomic background, whereas there is no effect in our sub-sample with high socio-economic background. |
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Björn Bartling, Urs Fischbacher, Shifting the blame: On delegation and responsibility, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 79 (1), 2012. (Journal Article)
To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects could either choose a fair allocation or an unfair allocation or delegate the choice, and we used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this can constitute a strong motive for the delegation of a decision right. Moreover, we propose a simple measure of responsibility and show that this measure outperforms measures based on inequity aversion or reciprocity in predicting punishment behaviour. |
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Björn Bartling, Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 79 (3), 2011. (Journal Article)
This paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other-regarding preferences. It offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance evaluation. We analyze a principal-multi agent model and assume that agents are inequity averse or status seeking. We show that team contracts can be optimal even if the agents’ performance measures are positively correlated such that relative performance evaluation would be optimal with purely self-interested agents and even though relative performance evaluation provides additional incentives to provide effort if agents have other-regarding preferences. Furthermore, optimal incentive contracts for other-regarding agents can be low-powered as compared to contracts for purely self-interested agents. |
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Björn Bartling, Ferdinand A Von Siemens, Wage inequality and team production: An experimental analysis, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 32 (1), 2011. (Journal Article)
Numerous survey studies report that human resource managers curb wage inequality with the intent to avoid detrimental effects on workers’ morale. However, there exists little controlled empirical evidence demonstrating that horizontal social comparisons and wage inequality have adverse effects on worker behavior. In this paper, we present data from a laboratory experiment that studies the impact of wage inequality on participation and effort choices in team production. Overall, we do not find evidence that wage inequality has a significant impact on either participation or effort choices. |
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Björn Bartling, Relative Performance or Team Evaluation? Optimal Contracts for Other-Regarding Agents, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 79 (3), 2011. (Journal Article)
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