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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Björn Bartling
  • Ernst Fehr
  • Klaus M Schmidt
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE
Publisher Mohr Siebeck
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0932-4569
Volume 169
Number 1
Page Range 4 - 22
Date 2013
Abstract Text In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1628/093245613X660357
Other Identification Number merlin-id:7382
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