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Contribution Details
| Type | Conference Presentation |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Log-supermodular contests |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Presentation Type | paper |
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Event Title | 27th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association |
| Event Type | conference |
| Event Location | Málaga (Spain) |
| Event Start Date | August 27 - 2012 |
| Event End Date | August 31 - 2012 |
| Abstract Text | Contest theory has sometimes been restrained by the fact that the game theoretic solution of certain models is not readily available. Exam- ples include the Tullock game with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter and rank-order tournaments with little noise. In this paper, the class of log-supermodular contests is introduced, and it is shown that all equilibria in such contests feature either arbitrarily small, speculative bids or non-participation (often both). As a consequence, complete rent dissipation for all but at most one player is a necessary property of any equilibrium. If a log-supermodular contest is standard, anonymous, and between two players, then any equilibrium is revenue-equivalent to the all-pay auction equilibrium. For more than two players, however, there is a coordination problem. In par- ticular, these results shed light on the validity of the exclusion principlein imperfectly discriminating contests. |
| Free access at | Official URL |
| Official URL | http://www.eea-esem.com/eea-esem/2012/m/viewpaper.asp?pid=2754 |
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