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Contribution Details
| Type | Conference or Workshop Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Published in Proceedings | Yes |
| Title | Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms |
| Organization Unit |
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| Authors |
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| Presentation Type | paper |
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Event Title | Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) |
| Event Type | conference |
| Event Location | San Francisco, CA |
| Event Start Date | August 7 - 2011 |
| Event End Date | August 11 - 2011 |
| Place of Publication | San Francisco, CA |
| Abstract Text | The most prominent way to establish trust between buyers and sellers on online auction sites are reputation mechanisms. Two drawbacks of this approach are the reliance on the seller being long-lived and the susceptibility to whitewashing. In this paper, we introduce so-called escrow mechanisms that avoid these problems by installing a trusted intermediary which forwards the payment to the seller only if the buyer acknowledges that the good arrived in the promised condition. We address the incentive issues that arise and design an escrow mechanism that is incentive compatible, efficient, interim individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced. In contrast to previous work on trust and reputation, our approach does not rely on knowing the sellers' cost functions or the distribution of buyer valuations. |
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