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| Type | Conference or Workshop Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Published in Proceedings | Yes |
| Title | Optimal Grading |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Presentation Type | paper |
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Event Title | 26th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association |
| Event Type | conference |
| Event Location | Oslo |
| Event Start Date | August 25 - 2011 |
| Event End Date | August 29 - 2011 |
| Abstract Text | Assuming that teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students - with ability signaling, in this paper we model a teacher-student relationship as an agency problem with conflicting interests. In our model, the teacher elicits effort from a student rewarding for it with a grade, the utility of which to the student is the ability signal inferred by the job market. In the event that the job market does not observe individual teachers' grading practices, teachers find grades as costless rewards and optimally choose to be lenient in grading. As a result, "the problem of the commons" of good grades emerges leading to the depreciation of grading standards and grade inflation. The prediction of the model that the lower the expectations the teacher holds about her students' abilities, the flatter the grading rules she sets up is empirically supported. |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/iere.12121 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:6128 |
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