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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Stock options and managers’ incentives to cheat |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Further Contribution (e.g. review article, editorial) |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Review of Derivatives Research |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1380-6645 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Number | 1-2 |
| Page Range | 41 - 59 |
| Date | 2008 |
| Abstract Text | This paper develops a continuous-time real options’ pricing model to study managers’ incentives to cheat in the presence of equity-based compensation plans. It shows that managers’ incentives to cheat are strongly influenced by the efficiency of the justice. The model’s main result is that managers have greater incentives to commit fraudulent actions under stock options than under common stocks based compensation plans. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1007/s11147-008-9023-0 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:550 |
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