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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Asymmetric Reduced Form Auctions
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Konrad Mierendorff
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Economics Letters
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
Volume 110
Number 1
Page Range 41 - 44
Date 2011
Abstract Text This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.019
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