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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of the European Economic Association |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1542-4766 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Number | 4 |
| Page Range | 770 - 799 |
| Date | 2006 |
| Abstract Text | We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often. In contrast, many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, that is, they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability. |
| Free access at | Related URL |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.4.770 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:3497 |
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