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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Screening budgets |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0167-2681 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Number | 3 |
| Page Range | 351 - 374 |
| Date | 2006 |
| Abstract Text | How should an organization’s center allocate resources to units under its control which are better informed? Even with conscientious productivity reviews, important information will remain asymmetrically held. If units value their own expenditures more than those of their peers, they will seek excess budgets and expenditures. Fortunately, budget authorities can infer productivities from units’ expenditure patterns across spending categories and over time. Optimal screening budgets reward more productive units with greater overall budgets. Such screening provides significant welfare gains over traditional fixed or reallocable budgets. Empirical results for a large electricity and infrastructure provider fit an important version of the model. |
| Free access at | Related URL |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.12.004 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:3467 |
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