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Type Conference or Workshop Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Published in Proceedings Yes
Title Game theoretical analysis of incentives for large-scale, fully decentralized collaboration networks
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Thomas Bocek
  • Michael Shann
  • D Hausheer
  • Burkhard Stiller
Editors
  • IEEE
Presentation Type paper
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
ISBN 978-1-4244-1693-6
ISSN 1530-2075
Page Range 1 - 8
Event Title International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Event Type workshop
Event Location Miami, Florida, USA
Event Start Date April 14 - 2008
Event End Date April 18 - 2008
Place of Publication Los Alamitos
Publisher IEEE Computer Society
Abstract Text One of the key challenges in peer-to-peer networks is the design of incentives to encourage peers to share their resources. Incentives are necessary in order to exploit the full potential of these systems. The tit-for-tat incentive scheme, as used in BitTorrent for example, has proven to be a successful approach in P2P file sharing systems, where peers have direct relations and share the same kind of resources. However, in P2P systems where different kind of resources are shared between peers with non-direct relations, the design of incentives remains a challenge. In this paper, a large-scale, fully decentralized P2P collaboration network is shown, where peers share not only bandwidth and storage space, but also contribute by editing articles and voting for or against changes. A new incentive scheme is proposed which supports non-direct relations and provides incentives for sharing different kind of resources. The incentive scheme is based on a reputation system that assigns a reputation value to every peer reflecting its previous behavior in the network. Based on this value, the service level is differentiated, i.e. the higher a peer's reputation the better the quality of service it can get from the network. The service differentiation has been analyzed and simulated with rational, irrational and altruistic peers based on game theory concepts.
Official URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4536195
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/IPDPS.2008.4536195
Other Identification Number merlin-id:325
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Additional Information This paper was presented at Fifth International Workshop on Hot Topics in Peer-to-Peer Systems (Hot-P2P 2008) in Miami, Florida, April 18, 2008, which was in conjunction with: IPDPS 2008, April 14-18, 2008 - Miami, Florida US (http://www.ipdps.org/). © 2008 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.