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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Higher-Order Beliefs, Market-Based Incentives, and Information Quality |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | European Accounting Review |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1468-4497 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Number | 2 |
| Page Range | 569 - 587 |
| Date | 2024 |
| Abstract Text | We investigate how interdependence among investors' beliefs affects the reliance on market prices as a performance measure and how this in turn affects the firm's preference for financial reporting quality. When investors want to align their values more with other investors' beliefs, optimal contracts become more reliant on the accounting report and less on the market price, emphasizing the stewardship role of accounting in a herding market. If the baseline accounting quality required by a reporting standard is high enough, the firm prefers to increase its accounting quality for the sake of contracting efficiency. However, if the baseline quality is low, the firm further lowers accounting quality for the same reason. The benchmark level that determines whether the firm prefers to increase accounting quality increases with the interdependence of investors' beliefs, implying that it is difficult to align the information and stewardship roles of accounting in a herding market. |
| Free access at | DOI |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1080/09638180.2022.2109706 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:23443 |
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| Additional Information | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 |