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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	On market prices in double auctions
Organization Unit	Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)
Authors	Simon Jantschgi Heinrich H Nax Bary S R Pradelski Marek Pycia
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number	404
ISSN	1664-7041
Number of Pages	14
Date	2022
Abstract Text	We address some open issues regarding the characterization of double auctions. Our model is a two-sided commodity market with either finitely or infinitely many traders. We first unify existing formulations for both finite and infinite markets and generalize the characterization of market clearing in the presence of ties. Second, we define a mechanism that achieves market clearing in any, finite or infinite, market instance and show that it coincides with the k-double auction by Rustichini et al. (1994) in the former case. In particular, it clarifies the consequences of ties in submissions and makes common regularity assumptions obsolete. Finally, we show that the resulting generalized mechanism implements Walrasian competitive equilibrium.
Related URLs	https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html
Other Identification Number	merlin-id:22226
PDF File	Download from ZORA
Export	BibTeX EP3 XML (ZORA)
Keywords	Double auction, Walrasian equilibrium, finite and infinite markets, axiomatization