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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Fairness principles for insurance contracts in the presence of default risk |
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| Institution | Cornell University |
| Series Name | ArXiv.org |
| Number | 2009.04408 |
| ISSN | 2331-8422 |
| Number of Pages | 25 |
| Date | 2020 |
| Abstract Text | We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the analysis that when a contract is exposed to the default risk of the insurance company, ex-ante equilibrium considerations require a certain participation in the benefit of the company to be specified in the contracts. The fair benefit participation of agents appears as an outcome of a game involving the residual risks induced by the default possibility and using fuzzy coalitions. |
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| Digital Object Identifier | 10.48550/arXiv.2009.04408 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:19790 |
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