Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | European Journal of Political Economy |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0176-2680 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Number | 4 |
| Page Range | 915 - 931 |
| Date | 2005 |
| Abstract Text | We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.04.003 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|