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Contribution Details
Type | Journal Article |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Auftrag und Grenzen der Sozialen Krankenversicherung |
Other Titles | Mission and Limits of Social Health Insurance |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Item Subtype | Original Work |
Refereed | Yes |
Status | Published in final form |
Language |
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Journal Title | Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik |
Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
Geographical Reach | international |
ISSN | 1465-6493 |
Volume | 7 |
Number | S1 |
Page Range | 5 - 26 |
Date | 2006 |
Abstract Text | DEUTSCH: Dieser Beitrag setzt sich zum Ziel, zwei miteinander verbundene Fragen zu beantworten: 1. Was ist der Auftrag der Krankenversicherung? Oder in anderen Worten: Warum gibt es eine Nachfrage nach sozialer (bzw. staatlicher) Krankenversicherung? Ist sie der Grund dafu¨ r, dass in den meisten entwickelten La¨ndern die private Krankenversicherung ein Schattendasein fu¨hrt? 2. Wo liegen die Grenzen der Sozialen Krankenversicherung? Kann man sagen, es gebe ein Zuviel an Sozialer Krankenversicherung in mindestens einer der beiden Dimensionen? Sollte ihre Vorherrschaft zu Gunsten der privaten Krankenversicherung gebrochen werden? Ist das heutige Ausmaß der Deckung zu hoch? ENGLISH: This contribution seeks to answer two questions, (1) What are the reasons for a demand for social health insurance (SHI)?, and (2) What are the limits to the growth of SHI? A review of the reasons for the existence of SHI reveals that while economists have emphasized the possible contribution of SHI to efficiency, the available evidence points to public choice reasons, which also seem to explain better the growth of SHI. Indeed, since private insurance redistributes as well (albeit governed by chance), it is tempting for politicians to use SHI for systematic redistribution (the extent of which cannot easily be detected by net payers). Turning to the supply of SHI, two dimensions are studied in some detail, viz. efforts at product innovation and at risk selection. Competing suppliers of SHI, while hampered by risk adjustment which sanctions innovators for attracting the young, are predicted to invest in innovation. A monopolistic public SHI scheme, by way of contrast, does not need to select risks and, on the other hand, it is predicted to refrain from product innovation. This is but one limit to the growth of SHI; the ultimate one is citizens' lack of willingness to pay for its continuing expansion, about which some evidence for the case of Switzerland is presented. |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/j.1465-6493.2006.00214.x |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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