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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms |
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| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Economics Bulletin |
| Publisher | Economics Bulletin |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1545-2921 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Page Range | online |
| Date | 2007 |
| Abstract Text | It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators. |
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