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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Ernst Fehr
  • Susanne Kremhelmer
  • Klaus M Schmidt
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Economic Journal
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0013-0133
Volume 118
Number 531
Page Range 1262 - 1284
Date 2008
Abstract Text We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results cannot be explained by the self-interest model nor by models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they are largely consistent with approaches that focus on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02169.x
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Additional Information The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com