Not logged in.

Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Ordinal efficiency, fairness, and incentives in large markets
Organization Unit
  • Qingmin Liu
  • Marek Pycia
  • English
Institution SSRN eLibrary
Series Name SSRN
Number 1872713
ISSN 1556-5068
Number of Pages 27
Date 2016
Abstract Text Efficiency and symmetric treatment of agents are the primary goals of resource allocation in environments without transfers. Focusing on ordinal mechanisms in which no small group of agents can substantially change the allocations of others, we show that all asymptotically efficient, symmetric, and asymptotically strategy-proof mechanisms lead to the same allocations in large markets. In particular, many mechanisms - both well-known and newly developed - are allocationally equivalent. This equivalence is consistent with prior empirical findings that different mechanisms lead to similar allocations in school choice. We also show that uniform randomizations over deterministic efficient mechanisms are asymptotically efficient.
Official URL
Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.1872713
PDF File Download from ZORA
Export BibTeX