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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Formal home health care, informal care, and family decision making
Organization Unit
Authors
  • D Byrne
  • Michelle S. Sovinsky
  • B Hiedemann
  • S Stern
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title International Economic Review
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0020-6598
Volume 50
Number 4
Page Range 1205 - 1242
Date 2009
Abstract Text We use the 1993 wave of the AHEAD data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium where each family member jointly determines her consumption, transfers for formal care, and allocation of time to informal care, market work, and leisure. We use the estimates to decompose the effects of adult children's opportunity costs, quality of care, and caregiving burden on their propensities to provide informal care. We also simulate the effects of a broad range of policies of current interest.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00566.x
Other Identification Number doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00566.x
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