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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Hierarchical package bidding: a paper & pencil combinatorial auction
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Jacob Goeree
  • Charles A Holt
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0899-8256
Volume 70
Number 1
Page Range 146 - 169
Date 2010
Abstract Text We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Peke~c, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these 'wind tunnel' tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in the major upcoming 700MHz auction.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.013
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