Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0899-8256 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 212 - 223 |
| Date | 2011 |
| Abstract Text | The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for (i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.008 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|