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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | The effect of gate revenue sharing on social welfare |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Contemporary Economic Policy |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1074-3529 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Number | 3 |
| Page Range | 448 - 459 |
| Date | 2008 |
| Abstract Text | This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league based on contest theory and studies the welfare effect of gale revenue sharing. It derives two counterintuitive results. First, it challenges the "invariance proposition" by showing that revenue sharing reduces competitive balance and thus produces a more unbalanced league. Second, the paper concludes that a lower degree of competitive balance compared with the noncooperative league equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare and club profits. Combining both results, it concludes that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare and club profits in our model. |
| Official URL | http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120174660/abstract |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2007.00090.x |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:1038 |
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