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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Decision spread in the corporate board network
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Stefano Battiston
  • Gérard Weisbuch
  • Eric Bonabeau
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Advances in Complex Systems
Publisher World Scientific Publishing
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0219-5259
Volume 6
Number 4
Page Range 631 - 644
Date 2003
Abstract Text The boards of large corporations sharing some of their directors are connected in complex networks. Boards are responsible for corporations' long-term strategy and are often involved in decisions about a common topic related to the belief in economical growth or recession. We are interested in understanding under which conditions a large majority of boards making the same decision can emerge in the network. We present a model where board directors are engaged in a decision-making dynamics based on "herd behavior." Boards influence each other through shared directors. We find that imitation of colleagues and opinion bias due to the interlock do not trigger an avalanche of identical decisions over the board network, whereas the information about interlocked boards' decisions does. There is no need to invoke global public information, nor external driving forces. This model provides a simple endogenous mechanism to explain the fact that boards of the largest corporations of a country can, in the span of a few months, make the same decisions about general topics.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1142/S0219525903001109
Other Identification Number merlin-id:10158
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Keywords Social networks, opinion dynamics, directorate interlock, Ising model