Contributions in Merlin

Modern society is challenged by a loss of efficiency in national governance systems values, and lifestyles. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) discourse builds upon a conception of organizational legitimacy that does not appropriately reflect these changes. The problems arise from the a-political role of the corporation in the concepts of cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy, which are based on compliance to national law and on relatively homogeneous and stable societal expectations on the one hand and widely accepted rhetoric assuming that all members of society benefit from capitalist production on the other. We therefore propose a fundamental shift to moral legitimacy, from an output and power oriented approach to an input related and discursive concept of legitimacy. This shift creates a new basis of legitimacy and involves organizations in processes of active justification vis-à-vis society rather than simply responding to the demands of powerful groups. We consider this a step towards the politicization of the corporation and attempt to re-embed the debate on corporate legitimacy into its broader context of political theory, while reflecting the recent turn from a liberal to a deliberative concept of democracy.

We consider classes of stochastic linear programming problems which can be efficiently solved by deterministic algorithms. For two–stage recourse problems we identify two such classes. The first one consists of problems where the number of stochastically independent random variables is relatively low; the second class is the class of simple recourse problems. The proposed deterministic algorithm is successive discrete approximation. We also illustrate the impact of required accuracy on the efficiency of this algorithm. For jointly chance constrained problems with a random right–hand–side and multivariate normal distribution we demonstrate the increase in efficiency when lower accuracy is required, for a central cutting plane method. We support our argumentation and findings with computational results.

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We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often. In contrast, many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, that is, they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.

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