Contributions in Merlin

Measuring individual welfare using data on reported subjective well-being has made great progress. It offers a new way of confronting public choice hypotheses with field data, e.g. with respect to partisan preferences on unemployment and inflation or rents in the public bureaucracy. Insights from public choice also help to assess the role of happiness measures in public policy. We emphasize that maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function neglects incentive problems and political institutions while citizens are reduced to metric stations. The goal of happiness research should be to improve the nature of the processes through which individuals can express their preferences.

Die Steuerung der Hochschullandschaft der Schweiz und vorab die Rolle des Bundes soll grundsätzlich reformiert werden. Ausgehend vom hochschulpolitischen Konzept der 1990er Jahre werden Trends und damit verbundener Wandel in Lehre und Forschung beschrieben. Dies führt zu Herausforderungen einer künftigen hochschulpolitischen Steuerung. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird das Konzept des vorliegenden neuen Bundesgesetzes über die Förderung der Hochschulen und die Koordination im schweizerischen Hochschulbereich (HFKG) skizziert und werden Schwierigkeiten für dessen Verabschiedung, in Kraft Setzung und Umsetzung diskutiert.

When a company goes public, it is standard practice that the underwriting syndicate allocates more shares than are issued. The underwriter thus holds a short position that it commonly fills by aftermarket trading when market prices fall or, when prices rise, by executing the so-called overallotment option. This option is a standard feature of initial public offering (IPO) arrangements that allows the underwriter to purchase more shares from the issuer at the original offer price. We propose a theoretical model to study the implications of this combination of short position and overallotment option on the pricing of the IPO. Maximizing the sum of both the profits from their share of the offer revenue and the potential profits from aftermarket trading, we show that underwriters strategically distort the offer price. This results either in exacerbated underpricing when favorably informed underwriters lower prices to secure a signaling benefit, or in informationally inefficient offer prices when underwriters pool in offer prices irrespective of their information.

The relation between the intensity of competition and R&D investmenthas received a lot of attention, both in the theoretical and in the empirical literature. Nevertheless, no consensus on the sign of the effect of competition on innovation has emerged. This survey of the literature identifies sources of confusion in the theoretical debate. My discussion is mainly based on a unified model that simplifies the comparison of different results. This model is also applied to show which factors work in favor of a positive relation between competition and innovation.

With rapid urban expansion and loss of open space, attractive local landscapes will continue to gain importance in location decisions and on political agendas. The present study reviews the evidence on the local economic role of landscape amenities from two major strands of empirical research, migration and regional economic models, and hedonic pricing models. Following common amenity definitions we identify 71 relevant peer-reviewed studies and systematically assess the reported effects of the landscape amenity variables. The migration and regional economic studies suggest that migrants are attracted by amenities nearly as often as by low taxes. Reported effects of amenities on income and employment are less consistent. The hedonic studies suggest that nature reserves and land cover diversity have mostly, open space and forest often, and agricultural land rarely positive effects on housing prices. Studies at larger geographic scales and studies involving urban areas were more likely to identify significant amenity effects. Some limitations of the evidence may be overcome with better datasets and modeling approaches. However, in line with other recent work, the limitations also highlight the need for complementary information from the analysis of political preferences for land-use management.

Lin Ostrom’s work constitutes a great step forward in the analysis of social governance. Instead of focusing on the technical characteristics of goods she studies what types of institutions have emerged and how they affect individual motivation and behavior in public goods and commons situations. Her approach represents a careful analysis of institutions often emerging from below. Unorthodox impacts of institutions on individual motivation and behavior as well as the possible creation of new institutions must be taken into account. The constitution must ensure that the involved individuals can establish adequate institutions regardless of possible opposition by politicians and bureaucrats.

This article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' learning rates are private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or underexploited crucially depends on whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). We further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if the full-commitment assumption is relaxed.