Daniel Halbheer, Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Götte, Armin Schmutzler, Self-Reinforcing Market Dominance, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 711, 2007. (Working Paper)
Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. Wefind that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even srengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, aggregate investment is not affected by the initial efficiency distribution. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers. |
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Rafael Lalive, Armin Schmutzler, Exploring the Effects of Competition for Railway Markets, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 511, 2007. (Working Paper)
This paper studies the effects of introducing competition for local passenger railway markets in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. We compare the evolution of the frequency of service on lines that were exposed to competition for the market and lines that were not. Our results suggest that competitive lines enjoyed a stronger growth of the frequency of service than non-competitive lines, even after controlling for various line characteristics that might have an independent influence on the frequency of service. Our results further suggest that the effects of competition may depend strongly on the operator and on characteristics of the line. |
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Rafael Lalive, Armin Schmutzler, Entry in Liberalized Railway Markets: The German Experience, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 609, 2007. (Working Paper)
In Germany, competitive franchising is increasingly being used to procure passenger railway services that were previously provided by a state monopolist. This paper analyzes the 77 tenders that have taken place since the railway reform in 1994. The tenders differ with respect to the size of the franchise network, the required frequency of service, the duration of the contract and the proximity to other lines that are already run by competitors of DB Regio, a subsidiary of the successor of the former state monopolist. Our analysis shows that larger networks are less likely to be won by the competitors. Also, more recent auctions have been won by competitors more frequently than earlier auctions. Other control variables such as the duration of the contract and the adjacency to other lines run by entrants are insignificant. |
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Hans Gersbach, Armin Schmutzler, Does Globalization Create Superstars?, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 706, 2007. (Working Paper)
To examine the impact of globalization on managerial compensation, we consider a matching model where a number of firms compete both in the product market and in the managerial market. We show that globalization, i.e. the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools, leads to an increase in the heterogeneity of managerial salaries. Typically, while the most able managers obtain a wage increase, less able managers are faced with a reduction in wages. Hence our model can explain the increasing heterogeneity of CEO compensation that has been observed in the last few decades. |
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Donja Darai, Dario Sacco, Armin Schmutzler, Competition and Innovation: An Experimental Investigation, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 608, 2007. (Working Paper)
The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms'incentives to invest in process innovations. We carry out experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. As predicted by theory, an increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments. However, a positive effect is observed for a switch from Cournot to Bertrand, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case. This result reflects overinvestment in the Bertrand case. The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are implemented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented. |
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Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, On the Role of Access Charges under Network Competition, In: Access Prices: Theory and Practice, Elsevier Science Ltd, Amsterdam, p. 121 - 148, 2007. (Book Chapter)
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Hans Gersbach, Armin Schmutzler, A Product-Market Theory of Industry-Specific Training, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 610, 2006. (Working Paper)
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms provide their workers with skills that are sufficiently general to be potentially useful for competitors. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in industry-specific human capital, then make wage offers for each others’ trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is sufficiently soft and returns to the number of trained workers decrease sufficiently, firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained workers. |
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Hans Gersbach, Armin Schmutzler, Foreign Direct Investment and R&D offshoring, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 606, 2006. (Working Paper)
We analyze a two-country model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Two firms, each of which is originally situated in only one of the two countries, first decide whether to build a plant in the foreign country. Then, they decide whether to relocate R&D activities. Finally, they engage in product-market competition. Our main points are: first, FDI liberalization causes a relocation of R&D activities if intrafirm communication is sufficiently well developed, external spillovers are substantial, competition is not too strong and foreign markets are not too small. Second, such a relocation of R&D activities will usually nevertheless increase domestic welfare since it only occurs if intrafirm communication is well developed and therefore knowledge generated and obtained abroad flows back to the domestic country. Third, the potential of R&D offshoring makes FDI itself more likely. Fourth, when countries are asymmetric, the small-country firm is more likely to offshore its R&D activities into the large country than conversely. |
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Daniel Halbheer, Armin Schmutzler, Sarah Niggli, What does it take to sell environmental policy? An empirical analysis of referendum data, Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 33 (4), 2006. (Journal Article)
We analyze the factors that influence the support for environmental policy proposals. Swiss referendum data show that proposals obtain more yes-votes if they do not restrict consumption possibilities directly, if they are endorsed by the largest business association, if environmental preferences are strong and economic conditions are favorable at the time of the referendum. Also, there are more pro-environmental votes in cantons with higher population density. On the other hand, yes-votes do not seem to depend on whether a proposal involves a tax or not. |
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Daniel Halbheer, Essays in industrial organization and regulation, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2006. (Dissertation)
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Dennis Gärtner, Essays in industrial organization and mechanism design, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2006. (Dissertation)
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Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, Intimidating Competitors Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive Oligopoly, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 409, 2005. (Working Paper)
We examine the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and costreducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. We start from a linear Cournot model to motivate our more general reducedform framework. For this general framework, we establish the following main results: First, vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). Second, asymmetric equilibria typically involve integrated firms that invest more into effciency than their separated counterparts. Our findings suggest that asymmetric vertical integration is a potential explanation for the initial difference between leader and laggard in investment games. |
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Andreas Polk, Armin Schmutzler, Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 21 (4), 2005. (Journal Article)
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. |
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Daniel Halbheer, Sarah Niggli, Armin Schmutzler, What does it take to sell Environmental Policy? An empirical Analysis of Referendum Data, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 304, 2005. (Working Paper)
We analyze the factors that influence the support for environmental policy proposals. Swiss referendum data show that proposals obtain more yes-votes if they do not restrict consumption possibilities directly, if they are endorsed by business associations, if environmental preferences are strong and economic conditions are favorable at the time of the referendum. Also, there are more pro-environmental votes in cantons with higher population density. On the other hand, yes-votes do not seem to depend on whether a proposal involves a tax or not. |
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Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, On The Role of Access Charges Under Network Competition, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 501, 2005. (Working Paper)
We aim to clarify the role of access charges under two-way network competition, employing a reduced-form approach. Retaining the key features of specific network competition models but imposing less structure, we analyze the impact of changes in access charges on linear and non-linear retail prices. We derive su.cient conditions for usage fees to be increasing (and subscriber charges to be decreasing) in access charges. These conditions are shown to be satisfied only under rather restrictive assumptions on the demand for calls, suggesting that implementing collusion by inflating access charges is likely to be nonfeasible. |
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Hannes Egli, The environmental Kuznets Curve: theory and evidence, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2005. (Dissertation)
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Yves Schneider, Four essays in economics, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology, 2005. (Dissertation)
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Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, Asymmetric vertical integration, Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 5 (1), 2005. (Journal Article)
We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs. |
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Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, Asymmetric Vertical Integration, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 306, 2004. (Working Paper)
We examine vertical backward integration in a reducedform model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs. |
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Thomas Borek, Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, Mergers under Asymmetric Information Is there a Lemons Problem?, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 408, 2004. (Working Paper)
We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First, under very general conditions, equilibria exist where mergers take place, and there is no presumption that there is ineffciently low trade. Second, in these equilibria it is typically not the case that only low-type firms enter an agreement. |
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