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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction
Organization Unit	Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)
Authors	Christian Ewerhart
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number	155
ISSN	1664-7041
Number of Pages	43
Date	2014
Abstract Text	This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is complete rent dissipation for all but at most one player. This result is used to show that in any suffciently decisive anonymous standard contest, any equilibrium is an all-pay auction equilibrium. Thus, the analysis offers strong support for the robustness of the all-pay auction. The approach also delivers definite answers regarding the extent of rent dissipation in Tullock contests with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter.
Related URLs	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html
Other Identification Number	merlin-id:9525
PDF File	Download from ZORA
Export	BibTeX EP3 XML (ZORA)
Keywords	Contests, all-pay auction, rent-seeking, mixed Nash equilibrium, rent dissipation, Rent Seeking, Auktionstheorie, Verhalten, Verhaltensökonomie