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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 143 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 19 |
| Date | 2014 |
| Abstract Text | Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 < R < ∞") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being "halfhearted," which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp143.pdf |
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| Keywords | Tullock contest, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, analytical functions, Auktionstheorie, analytische Funktionen |