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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Long-term commitment and cooperation |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
Number | 130 |
ISSN | 1664-7041 |
Number of Pages | 50 |
Date | 2013 |
Abstract Text | We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate cooperation. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term relationships provides a means for fostering - and screening for - efficient cooperation. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp130.pdf |
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Keywords | Repeated games, cooperation, voluntary commitment, Verhalten, Entscheidungsverhalten, Entscheidungstheorie, Entscheidung, Commitment, Management, Kooperation, intrinsische Motivation |