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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	All-pay auctions: Implementation and optimality
Organization Unit	Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, and Environmental Economics (Armin Schmutzler)
Authors	Stefan Jönsson Armin Schmutzler
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number	108
ISSN	1664-7041
Number of Pages	44
Date	2013
Abstract Text	This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high expected highest efforts without generating excessive wasteful efforts of losers. All-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can do better than all-pay auctions with fixed prizes in this respect, in particular, when the prize function is approximately linear. We use the results to compare patents and prizes as innovation incentives, and to explore promotion incentives in organizations.
Official URL	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp108.pdf
Related URLs	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php
PDF File	Download from ZORA
Export	BibTeX EP3 XML (ZORA)
Keywords	Contests, all-pay auctions, endogenous prizes, implementation, Auktionstheorie, Spieltheorie, Anreizsystem