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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Robust stochastic stability |
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| Authors |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 63 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 40 |
| Date | 2014 |
| Abstract Text | A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp063.pdf |
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| Keywords | Learning in games, stochastic stability, radius-coradius theorems, logit-response dynamics, mutations, imitation, Spieltheorie, Stochastik |
| Additional Information | Revised version |