Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Language |
|
Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 40 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2000 |
Abstract Text | This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economicndomains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise to noncompetitive wage differences. Finally, reciprocity it is also a strong force contributing to the existence of incomplete contracts.n |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA) |