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Type	Working Paper
Scope	Discipline-based scholarship
Title	Quality Provision in Deregulated Industries: The Railtrack Problem
Organization Unit	Strategic Management and Business Policy (Egon Franck) Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, and Environmental Economics (Armin Schmutzler)
Authors	Men-Andri Benz Stefan Buehler Armin Schmutzler
Language	English
Institution	University of Zurich
Series Name	Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute
Number	No. 2
Date	2000
Abstract Text	This paper studies a network provider's incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. In a simple but general framework, we investigate how various institutional settings affect investment incentives. We show that under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives are smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration. We consider two strategies for improving investment incentives under vertical separation. First, the introduction of competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. Second, with non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.
Official URL	http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html
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