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Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
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Language |
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Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics |
Number | No. 55 |
ISSN | 1424-0459 |
Date | 2000 |
Abstract Text | In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences. |
Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/wp.html |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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