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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Matching with externalities |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Review of Economic Studies |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0034-6527 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Number | 2 |
| Page Range | 948 - 974 |
| Date | 2023 |
| Abstract Text | We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1093/restud/rdac032 |
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| Keywords | Economics and econometrics, matching with externalities, deferred acceptance algorithm, substitutability, labour markets with couples |
| Additional Information | Earlier published as ECON Working Paper No. 392: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/204367/ |