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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Diagonal payoff security and equilibrium existence in quasi-symmetric discontinuous games
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Christian Ewerhart
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 414
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 17
Date 2022
Abstract Text Payoff security combined with reciprocal upper semicontinuity is sufficient for better-reply security, and consequently for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, quasiconcave games by Reny's (1999) theorem. Analogously, diagonal payoff security combined with upper semicontinuity of the diagonal payoff function has been widely understood to be sufficient for diagonal better-reply security, and consequently for the existence of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, diagonally quasiconcave, quasi-symmetric games. We show by example that this is incorrect. Specifically, diagonal better-reply security may fail to hold, and a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium may fail to exist, if some player's payoff function lacks lower semicontinuity, with respect to the opponents' symmetric strategy profile, at all strategy profiles reached from a non-equilibrium profile on the diagonal by a unilateral better response of that player. These difficulties disappear, both in the game and in its mixed extension, if the lower bound on a player's payoff in the definition of diagonal payoff security is raised to reflect the higher levels that arbitrary better responses may achieve. We also discuss the relationship between our strengthened condition and diagonal payoff security.
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Keywords Discontinuous games, equilibrium existence, quasi-symmetric games, diagonal payoff security
Additional Information Revised version