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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information
Organization Unit
  • Christian Ewerhart
  • Dan Kovenock
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
  • English
Journal Title Operations Research Letters
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0167-6377
Volume 49
Number 3
Page Range 418 - 425
Date 2021
Abstract Text In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M ≤ N, full-support type distributions, and network games.
Related URLs
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.orl.2021.03.010
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Keywords Colonel Blotto games, private information, Bayes–Nash equilibrium, generalized Dirichlet distributions, networks