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Type | Journal Article |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Item Subtype | Original Work |
Refereed | Yes |
Status | Published in final form |
Language |
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Journal Title | Operations Research Letters |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Geographical Reach | international |
ISSN | 0167-6377 |
Volume | 49 |
Number | 3 |
Page Range | 418 - 425 |
Date | 2021 |
Abstract Text | In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M ≤ N, full-support type distributions, and network games. |
Free access at | DOI |
Related URLs | |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.orl.2021.03.010 |
Other Identification Number | merlin-id:21043 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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Keywords | Colonel Blotto games, private information, Bayes–Nash equilibrium, generalized Dirichlet distributions, networks |