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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Auctions of homogeneous goods: a case for pay-as-bid
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Marek Pycia
  • Kyle Woodward
Language
  • English
Institution Centre for Economic Policy Research
Series Name Discussion Paper Series
Number 15656
ISSN 0265-8003
Number of Pages 87
Date 2021
Abstract Text The pay-as-bid (or discriminatory) auction is a prominent format for selling homogenous goods such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of its pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable representation of equilibrium bids. Building on these results we analyze the optimal design of pay-as-bid auctions, as well as uniform-price auctions (the main alternative auction format), allowing for asymmetric information. We show that supply transparency and full disclosure are optimal in pay-as-bid, though not necessarily in uniform-price; pay-as-bid is revenue dominant and might be welfare dominant; and, under assumptions commonly imposed in empirical work, the two formats are revenue and welfare equivalent.
Official URL https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15656#
Other Identification Number merlin-id:20761
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