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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Finite blockchain games |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 355 |
| ISSN | 1664-705X |
| Number of Pages | 11 |
| Date | 2020 |
| Abstract Text | This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect. |
| Official URL | https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/research/workingpapers.html?paper-id=1037 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:19603 |
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| Keywords | Blockchain, proof-of-work, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, selfish mining |
| Additional Information | Revised version |