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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 334 |
| ISSN | 1664-705X |
| Number of Pages | 41 |
| Date | 2019 |
| Abstract Text | The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:18779 |
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| Keywords | Career concerns, reputation, dynamic games, games of timing, strategic information transmission, Adverse Selektion, Karriere, Prestige, Prognose, Informationsvermittlung |