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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Informational requirements of nudging
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Jean-Michel Benkert
  • Nick Netzer
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Political Economy
Publisher University of Chicago Press
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0022-3808
Volume 126
Number 6
Page Range 2323 - 2355
Date 2018
Abstract Text A nudge is a paternalistic government intervention that attempts to improve choices by changing the framing of a decision problem. We propose a welfare-theoretic foundation for nudging similar in spirit to the classical revealed preference approach, by investigating a framework in which preferences and mistakes of an agent can be elicited from her choices under different frames. We provide characterizations of the classes of behavioral models in which the information required for nudging can or cannot be deduced from choice data.
Free access at DOI
Digital Object Identifier 10.1086/700072
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Keywords Economics and econometrics