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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of Economic Psychology |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0167-4870 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Page Range | 37 - 58 |
| Date | 2019 |
| Abstract Text | We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts by (i) standardized computer reports or by (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers, representing a common form of consumer feedback. Compared to our baseline without reporting, computer reports reduce deception in all payoff scenarios while the effect of individually written reports is lower and in some scenarios only marginal. This comparably weaker impact can be explained by the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and hence seem to back the wrong horse initially. |
| Official URL | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167487017306207 |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.joep.2018.10.001 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:16836 |
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