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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title The reinforcement heuristic in normal form games
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Carlos Alos-Ferrer
  • Alexander Ritschel
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0167-2681
Volume 152
Page Range 224 - 234
Date 2018
Abstract Text We analyze simple reinforcement-based behavioral rules in 3 × 3 games through choice data and response times. We argue that there is a large overlap between reinforcement-based heuristics (win-stay, lose-shift) and the more “rational” behavioral rule of myopic best reply. However, evidence from response times shows that choices in agreement with the common prescription of those rules are comparatively fast, and choices of the form “lose-shift” occur more frequently for larger differences with bygone payoffs. Both observations speak in favor of reinforcement processes as a cognitive shortcut for apparent myopic best reply, and advise caution when interpreting behavioral results in favor of optimizing behavior.
Official URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268118301732
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.014
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Keywords Reinforcement, myopic best reply, response times, decision processes