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Contribution Details
Type | Journal Article |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Item Subtype | Original Work |
Refereed | Yes |
Status | Published in final form |
Language |
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Journal Title | Economics Letters |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Geographical Reach | international |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
Volume | 169 |
Page Range | 51 - 54 |
Date | 2018 |
Abstract Text | The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent. |
Related URLs | |
Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
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Keywords | Contests, mixed-strategy equilibrium, rent dissipation, uniqueness |