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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Christian Ewerhart
  • Guang-Zhen Sun
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Economics Letters
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0165-1765
Volume 169
Page Range 51 - 54
Date 2018
Abstract Text The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
Related URLs
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010
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Keywords Contests, mixed-strategy equilibrium, rent dissipation, uniqueness